Political ambition and opposition legislative review

Bill scrutiny as an intra-party signalling device

verfasst von: Lion Behrens, Dominic Nyhuis, Thomas Gschwend
Abstract: Recent research on executive–legislative relations in parliamentary democracies has shown that members of majority parties submit amendments to government bills to police the coalition compromise and to distinguish themselves from their coalition partners. It is poorly understood, however, what motivates members of the opposition to engage in the resource-intensive work of proposing changes to government bills. Not only are amendment proposals by the opposition often unsuccessful (lack of policy motivation), they are largely invisible to the electorate (lack of vote motivation). We argue that amendments by the opposition are best understood as reflecting office motivations of legislators. Ambitious legislators draft amendments to signal skill and expertise to their party peers, which is rewarded with promotions to higher office. We confirm our argument with original data from a German state parliament. The findings further our understanding of legislative review, individual legislative efforts and career trajectories.
Organisationseinheit(en): Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Externe Organisation(en): Universität Mannheim
Typ: Artikel
Journal: European Journal of Political Research
Band: 63
Seiten: 66-88
Anzahl der Seiten: 23
ISSN: 0304-4130
Publikationsdatum: 07.01.2024
Publikationsstatus: Veröffentlicht
Peer-reviewed: Ja
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete: Soziologie und Politikwissenschaften
Elektronische Version(en): https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12583 (Zugang: Offen)

BibTeX

@article{667e190b61c746848cc5eb9039389800,
title = "Political ambition and opposition legislative review: Bill scrutiny as an intra-party signalling device",
abstract = "Recent research on executive–legislative relations in parliamentary democracies has shown that members of majority parties submit amendments to government bills to police the coalition compromise and to distinguish themselves from their coalition partners. It is poorly understood, however, what motivates members of the opposition to engage in the resource-intensive work of proposing changes to government bills. Not only are amendment proposals by the opposition often unsuccessful (lack of policy motivation), they are largely invisible to the electorate (lack of vote motivation). We argue that amendments by the opposition are best understood as reflecting office motivations of legislators. Ambitious legislators draft amendments to signal skill and expertise to their party peers, which is rewarded with promotions to higher office. We confirm our argument with original data from a German state parliament. The findings further our understanding of legislative review, individual legislative efforts and career trajectories.",
keywords = "Germany, intra-party politics, legislative review, political ambition, political careers",
author = "Lion Behrens and Dominic Nyhuis and Thomas Gschwend",
note = "Funding Information: A previous version of this article was presented at the 14th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, 24–28 August 2020. We are grateful to Tom Louwerse for their helpful comments and suggestions. For excellent research assistance, we thank Felix M{\"u}nchow, Morten Harmening and Marie‐Lou Sohnius. This research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) via the SFB 884 on “The Political Economy of Reforms” (Project C7) and the University of Mannheim's Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences (GESS).",
year = "2024",
month = jan,
day = "7",
doi = "10.1111/1475-6765.12583",
language = "English",
volume = "63",
pages = "66--88",
journal = "European Journal of Political Research",
issn = "0304-4130",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "1",
}